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Rethinking the Post-War Period in Spain: 
Violence and Irregular Civil War, 1939-1952 
Jorge Marco (University of Bath) 
 
“We believed that with our Crusade we were achieving peace, but 
you, however, know that we have been at war for ten years”1 
 
 In a remote Spanish village dozens of left-wing peasants are arrested by 
the Civil Guard (rural militarised police force). After several days in jail the 
guards choose six and order them to board a truck. An hour later the six peasants 
lie dead in an isolated area, having been murdered. Hundreds of kilometres away 
the Civil Guard arrest three young peasants in an Andalusian village. They spend 
the first night in the Civil Guard post. The next morning they are driven away in a 
car. Their families fear that they have been killed. However, the Civil Guard have 
taken them to a factory on the outskirts of the village where they are tortured 
throughout the night. The following morning they are handed over to the 
Regulars, the much-feared army units composed of soldiers from the Spanish 
colony in Morocco. The soldiers tie them to horses, dragging them along a rocky 
path before stoning them. Finally, the dying youths are finished off with a bullet 
in the head. The villagers see that the path is covered in blood and mutilated 
body parts. The parish register records them as “shot by the Civil Guard”.  
A specialist on the subject would say that these two massacres probably 
took place at the start of the Civil War, between summer 1936 and spring 1937. 
However, the first case described occurred on 18th November 1947 and the 
second between 20th and 22nd April 1950; eight and eleven years, respectively, 
since the supposed end of the Civil War. In both cases the victims were relatives 
or collaborators of anti-Francoist guerrillas.2 The reason for this chronological 
                                                          
1 Francisco Franco’s speech on the 10th anniversary of his rise to power, 1st October 1946, in: La 
Vanguardia, 2 October 1946, 3 
2 Josep Sánchez Cervelló (ed.), Maquis. El puño que golpeó el franquismo. La Agrupación Guerrillera de 
Levante-Aragón (Barcelona 2003), 229; Interviews with Eduardo Triviño, Virtudes Martín and Rosario 
Triviño, in: David Baird, Between Two fires: Guerrilla war in the Spanish Guerrillas (Frigiliana 2008), 
xix, 69-70, 160, 168-170, 176-177 
confusion is the predominance of certain archetypes of violence against civilians 
in studies of the war and postwar period in Spain. The predominant 
interpretation of the violence in the Spanish Civil War is that there were two 
main phases. The first, between July 1936 and spring 1937, can be characterized by 
the brutality shown by the Francoist troops to the civilian population, especially 
that shown by the Regulars and the Spanish Legion, steeped in the culture of 
colonial warfare, and by the extrajudicial murders carried out by the forces of law 
and order and paramilitary groups. The second phase, from spring 1937, involved 
the transformation of ‘hot-blooded terror’ into bureaucratic terror meted out by 
the military courts.3  
 The main focus of studies on the repression of the 1940s has been centred 
on the analysis of what Franco’s dictatorship called the purging of responsibilities 
for the crimes committed during the war and hinders the chronological 
identification of the two massacres described. Academic researchers correctly 
point out that the postwar violence was not simply a matter of settling old scores, 
as in Western Europe after the Second World War (WWII), but a continuation of 
the policy of political cleansing initiated at the start of the war.4 The problem is 
that studies have tended to analyse the different instruments of institutional 
violence employed against the losing side: military courts, massive imprisonment 
and various types of economic, work-related, social and cultural repression; 
without considering other logics of violence.  
Both approaches reinforce the idea of a slow but steady transformation of 
‘hot-blooded terror’ into ‘cold-blooded terror’, that is, the progressive 
institutionalization of the violence. This interpretation creates certain difficulties 
in the analysis of the violence between 1936 and 1952. Firstly, local studies show 
that in areas where the coup succeeded in July 1936 and in zones occupied by 
Francoist troops in the first phase of the war, the institutionalization of the 
                                                          
3 Julián Casanova, ‘Rebelión y Revolución’, in Santos Juliá (coord.), Víctimas de la Guerra Civil (Madrid 
1999), 159-177; Francisco Espinosa, ‘Julio de 1936. Golpe de Estado y plan de exterminio’, in Julián 
Casanova (coord.), Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco (Barcelona 2002), 86. 
4 Javier Rodrigo, Hasta la raíz. Violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura franquista (Madrid 2008), 
48; Peter Anderson, The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945 (New York 2010), 
53; Gutmaro Gómez Bravo and Jorge Marco, La obra del miedo. Violencia y sociedad en la España 
franquista, 1936-1950 (Barcelona 2011), 61-69 
violence was not a linear process but also showed some regressions. Secondly, it 
does not consider the persistence of the massacres in occupied zones between 
1937 and 1939.5 Finally, it avoids or reduces to merely anecdotal the systematic 
perpetration of massacres in the 1940s, such as those described above. 
I would argue that two logics of Francoist violence operated in 1940s Spain 
within a common programme of political cleansing. The application of one logic 
or the other depended on the attitude of the vanquished to the defeat of the 
Republican Army: resignation or resistance. The logic of the violence inflicted on 
the defeated enemy was channelled by the institutions. Those classified as 
irredeemable were sentenced to death by military courts and executed. Those 
regarded as redeemable underwent a long process of isolation, punishment and 
forced conversion, which many did not survive. In contrast, the logic of 
counterinsurgency employed against the rebellious enemies, although employing 
instruments such as military courts and the prison system, utilized a wide variety 
of brutal practices and massacres against both civilians and combatants. 
Since a full analysis of the violence of the 1940s must integrate both logics 
it is necessary to problematize the concept of postwar in Spain. Although 1st April 
1939 marked the end of trench warfare it was not the end of the Spanish Civil 
War, rather, as the wife of a guerrilla fighter explained to her grandson, the “great 
war” was followed by the “little war”.6 From a military viewpoint the armed 
conflict was transformed from a conventional civil war between two regular 
armies into an irregular civil war7 in which the dictatorship fought scattered 
groups of guerrilla fighters and an invisible network of their civilian supporters. 
In geographical terms, the war moved from open battlefields to isolated areas of 
                                                          
5 Julio Prada, La España masacrada: la represión franquista de guerra y posguerra (Madrid 2010), 193-
194; Ángela Cenarro, ‘El triunfo de la reacción: fascistas y conservadores en Teruel’, in Julián Casanova, 
et. al., El pasado oculto. Fascismo y Violencia en Aragón, 1936-1939 (Huesca 1999), 187-188; Manuel 
Ortiz Heras, Violencia política en la II República y el primer franquismo (Madrid 1996), 298-307. 
6 Andrew Cowan, ‘The Guerrilla War against Franco’, European History Quarterly, 20 (1990), 227; Jorge 
Marco, ‘States of War: “Being Civilian” in 1940s Spain’, in Helen Graham (ed.), Interrogating Francoism: 
History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain (London 2016), 159; Interview with José Murillo 
(guerrilla fighter) in Alfonso Domingo, El canto del búho. La vida en el monte de los guerrilleros 
antifranquistas (Madrid 2002), 203 
7 On military concept of Conventional and Irregular Civil Wars, see: Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘Warfare in Civil 
Wars’, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War (Oxon 2005), 90-91 
the mountains and clandestine fighting in the cities. From this military 
perspective, the case of 1940s Spain bears close similarities to those of the Polish 
Civil War (1942-1948), the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and other irregular wars in 
the Baltic countries (1944-1953), the Ukraine (1944-1953) and Romania (1944-
1962). Indeed, events in Spain were far more similar to these cases than to the 
post-war periods of the other Western European countries.8  
When it is possible to classify an irregular armed conflict after a war as an 
irregular war? We need to address this question because the persistence of some 
erratic traces of armed struggle after the general cessation of hostilities in civil, 
colonial and international wars is a common phenomenon. Sometimes, these 
small skirmishes are merely the last embers of an extinguished conflagration.9. In 
other cases, the outcome is the opposite: the end of a war favours the 
multiplication of the armed actors, new economic interests and disputes over the 
control of territory and, as a consequence, a clear increase in violence and 
casualties.10 When the main actors persevere with the same political goals, the 
irregular armed conflict continues over time, rebel groups and state forces are 
mobilized to a significant degree and there is intense violence with large numbers 
of casualties, it is not possible to define this armed conflict as a simple post-war 
skirmishes or post-war violence. Instead, we should understand it as an irregular 
war. These features were all present, to a greater or lesser extent, in all of all the 
cases indicated above, including the Spanish one.  
                                                          
8 On this point I disagree with Kalyvas, who draws a comparison between the Greek and Spanish cases 
with reference to the period between 1936 and 1939 in Spain, without considering the period of irregular 
war. Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘How Not to Compare Civil Wars: Greece and Spain’, in Martin Baumeister and 
Stefenaie Schüler-Springorum (eds.), “If you tolerate this…”: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total 
War (Frankfurt 2008); Anita J. Prazmowska, Civil War in Poland, 1942–1948 (New York 2004), 143-159; 
Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (Cambridge 2010), 97-138; 
Doru Radosav, ‘Rezistenţa anticomunistă armată din Romȃnia între istorie şi memorie’, in Ruxandra 
Cesereanu (coord.), Comunism şi represiune în Romȃnia. Istoria tematică a unui fratricid national (Iaşi 
2006) 
9 Richard White, ‘Outlaw Gangs of the Middle Border: American Social Bandits’, The Western Historical 
Quarterly, 12-4 (1981); Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the 
American Civil War (New York, 1989), 231-247 
10 Heidrun Zinecker, Violence in Peace: Forms and causes of postwar violence in Guatemala (Frankfurt 
2006); Sarah Zukerman Daly, Organized Violence after Civil War: The Geography of Recruitment in 
Latin America (New York 2016) 
Academic studies have, with very few exceptions, avoided the logic of 
counterinsurgency due to the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement generally being 
considered as a secondary and peripheral phenomenon.11 In this article I will 
show that the violence employed against the rebellious enemy, on the contrary, 
dramatically affected the day to day life of a large part of the rural population 
during the 1940s. In fact, the logic of counterinsurgency preserved the brutality 
and massacres of civilians initiated in 1936 for more than a decade. I will also 
show that the logic of counterinsurgency deployed a new repertoire of violence 
which spread terror to even the most remote parts of the rugged Spanish 
countryside.   
 
Victims of the Irregular Civil War in Spain 
On 1st April 1939 the Francoist army announced from its general 
headquarters that, having achieved their ‘final military objectives (…) with the 
Red Army captive and disarmed (…) the war is over’.12  Two days later they 
declared “Spain is still at war with both its internal and external enemies”.13 The 
rhetorical use of the word ‘war’ in this slogan refers to the continuation of the 
policy of political cleansing started in 1936, now to be directed at those recently 
defeated. Consequently, around one million people were interned in 
concentration camps, prisons and forced labour camps,14 while, at the same time, 
the military courts became much more active. The magnitude of this process of 
repression resulted in the formation of the first armed self-defence groups by 
republican soldiers who refused to give themselves up at the end of the 
conventional war and ex-combatants who had managed to escape from 
concentration camps. These were to become the precarious basis for the future 
                                                          
11 Secundino Serrano, Maquis. Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista (Madrid 2001), 14, 17-18 
12 ‘Parte oficial de Guerra’, ABC, 2 April 1939, 1 
13 Slogan transmitted by Radio Nacional de España on 3 April 1939,  published in: La Vanguardia, 4 April 
1939, 1 
14 Javier Rodrigo, Los campos de concentración franquistas. Entre la Historia y la memoria (Madrid  2003), 
221; Edurne Beaumont and Fernando Mendiola, ‘Batallones Disciplinarios de Soldados Trabajadores: 
castigo político, trabajos forzados y cautividad’, Revista Historia Actual, 2-2 (2004), 35; Anuario 
Estadístico de España 1946-1947, Vol. II (Madrid 1947), 1240-1 
guerrilla movement. In 1946, when Francisco Franco declared that Spain had been 
at war for ten years, his use of the word ‘war’ lacked the rhetorical quality of 1939.15 
The most recent studies estimate that at least 20,000 people were killed by 
Franco’s dictatorship during the 1940s, the majority sentenced to death by the 
military courts.16 However, these figures do not include the hundreds of deaths 
caused by counterinsurgent violence, which are notoriously difficult to identify. 
The dictatorship employed three main methods to exterminate their rebellious 
enemy: combat, massacres and military courts. Both combatants and civilians 
were amongst the victims. However, as in all wars, particularly those which are 
irregular, the numbers are open to debate. According to official sources, the 
number of deaths directly attributable to the irregular war between 1943 and 1952 
was 3,433, comprising 2,489 combatants (of whom 2,173 were guerrilla fighters 
and 307 members of the regime’s forces) and 953 civilians killed by guerrilla 
groups.17 However, the records of the Civil Guard show lower numbers of both 
combatants and civilian victims. 
In these statistics, not all the dead guerrilla fighters were included, for 
which there are five principal reasons: 1) data was only collected for the period 
between 1943 and 1952, omitting deaths occurring between 1939 and 1942; 2) it is 
estimated that between 15% and 20% of guerrilla member deaths in some regions 
between 1943 and 1952 were not officially registered,18 3) these statistics are based 
on a total of 5,560 guerrilla fighters. However, several local studies have found a 
much higher number of guerrilla fighters, raising the estimated total to between 
6,000 and 7,000, many of whom died in combat or were killed extrajudicially19; 4) 
guerrilla fighters executed by a military court were not included; and 5) nor were 
                                                          
15 La Vanguardia, 2 October 1946, 3 
16 Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain 
(London 2012), vi 
17 Francisco Aguado, El maquis en España (Madrid 1975), 246-247 
18 Moreno, La resistencia, 685-686 
19 Aguado, El maquis, 246; Francisco Moreno, Historia y memoria del maquis. El cordobés Veneno, último 
guerrillero de La Mancha (Madrid 2006), 231-233 
the 129 guerrilla fighters killed during Operation Reconquest of Spain20 in 1944.21 
Consequently, I estimate that between 3,000 and 3,500 guerrillas were killed 
between 1939 and 1952, mainly in combat or extrajudicially, with few executed by 
a military court.  
It is more difficult to determine the number of civilians killed during the 
irregular war.  With regard to civilians killed by guerrilla groups, in Asturias and 
Córdoba 52 and 20 more cases, respectively, have been identified than are 
recorded in the official statistics.22 Since the Civil Guard figures exclude data from 
1939 to 1942 this pattern is likely to be repeated in other regions, although as the 
guerrilla carried out more personal attacks in Asturias than anywhere else, the 
overall figure would probably not increase greatly. Nonetheless, at least 1,000 
civilians were killed by the resistance.  
To determine the number of civilian victims of the dictatorship’s 
repression during the irregular war is even more complex. According to Civil 
Guard statistics, 19,444 civilians were arrested and tried for collaboration with the 
anti-Francoist guerrilla groups between 1943 and 1952, although they indicate 
that the number of go-betweens (members of the civilian population who helped 
the guerrilla fighters) may have been three or four times that of those arrested: 
between 60,000 and 80,000.23 The Brigada Politico-Social (political police) admits 
to having arrested 8,324 people involved in clandestine political organizations 
between 1946 and 1951, of whom around 7,000 must have been involved, directly 
or indirectly with the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement.24 However, these official 
figures at national level do not fit with those at provincial level. For example, only 
in the province of Toledo, 5,349 people accused of collaboration with the guerrilla 
groups and clandestine organizations were arrested between 1941 and 1948, while, 
                                                          
20 Military operation led by the Spanish Communist Party in October/November 1944 to liberate from 
France a small territory in Spain. The main goal was to settle the headquarters of the Communist irregular 
army.  
21 Serrano, Maquis, 135 
22 García Piñeiro, Luchadores, 651; Moreno, ‘La represión, 394 
23 Eduardo Munilla, ‘Consecuencias de la lucha de la Guardia Civil contra el bandolerismo en el periodo 
1943-52’, Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil, 1 (1968), 55; Aguado, El Maquis, 247, 250 
24 Comisaría General Político-Social, Dirección General de Seguridad, La actividad político-social 
clandestina en España durante 1951, enero de 1952. Fondo Contemporáneo. Ministerio del Interior. 
Microfilm 53,077 (Archivo Histórico Nacional) 
in Asturias, military courts tried around 5,000 people for clandestine activities 
and crimes against state security.25 
These figures serve to illustrate the level of mass arrests of those civilians 
who supported the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement or formed part of the anti-
Francoist opposition, but, how many died as a result of their involvement? 
Franco’s dictatorship passed two specific laws to repress the guerrilla movement: 
the Law of State Security in 1941 and the Law-Decree of Banditry and Terrorism in 
1947.26 Both enabled the courts to sentence thousands of go-betweens (and 
guerrilla fighters) to prison or death. However, most civilians were killed in 
massacres, particularly during the period known as ‘the three years of terror’ 
between 1947 and 1949.  
The official records provide no data for the number of civilians killed by 
the dictatorship for collaborating with the guerrilla, with one exception: in the 
province of Granada, the Civil Guard admits to having killed 201 go-betweens, of 
whom 95% died between 1947 and 1952.27 The opposition in exile presented the 
Assembly of the United Nations with a list of 588 anti-Francoists identified as 
having been killed by the dictatorship between 1st January 1947 and 5th August 
1948. More than 90% were peasants accused of collaborating with the resistance. 
Of these, 517 died in massacres or under torture, while 71 were executed having 
been sentenced to death by a military court.28 To establish the definitive number 
of civilians killed by the dictatorship during the irregular war is difficult as the 
perpetrators took steps to hide their crimes by not registering the deaths, 
falsifying the cause of death or declaring the victims as missing persons. 
                                                          
25 Moreno, La resistencia, 688; García Piñeiro, Luchadores, 996. 
26 Ley para la Seguridad del Estado de 29 de marzo de 1941, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 11 April 1941, 
2,434-2,444; Decreto-Ley de 18 de abril de 1947 sobre represión de los delitos de bandidaje y terrorismo, 
Boletín Oficial del Estado, 6 May 1947, 2,686-2,687  
27 Eulogio Limia, Informe General del proceso seguido por el problema del bandolerismo en la provincia 
de Granada, Agosto de 1952, 86, Movimiento Guerrillero, Caja 105, Carpeta 3/2 (AHCCPCE) 
28 ‘Ante la Asamblea de la ONU en París denunciamos la guerra implacable que Franco hace al pueblo 
español’, Mundo Obrero, 132, 28 August 1948, 1-2 
However, basing my estimate on recent research at regional level,29 I believe this 
would be between 2,000 and 3,000 civilians.  
To conclude, the number of deaths directly related to the irregular war in 
Spain between 1939 and 1952 must be between 6,500 and 8,000, with an even 
division between civilians and combatants. Of these, around 5,000 to 6,500 were 
victims of the dictatorship. These figures are significantly lower than those from 
the irregular wars which took place after WWII in the Ukraine, Lithuania and 
from the Greek Civil War.30 In this sense, the Spanish case bears closer 
similarities to the Poland, Latvian, Estonian and Romanian irregular wars, waged 
between Communist states and anti-Communist partisans groups.31  
 
From Conventional to Irregular Civil War 
 The Spanish Civil War was a constant learning curve for the Spanish 
military, which lacked the knowledge of its European counterparts, with 
experience in the First World War (WWI). Spanish military leaders were 
seasoned veterans in the colonial war of Morocco, which had allowed them to 
develop a wide repertoire of brutal tactics.32 However, this grounding was 
insufficient in the context of a modern war. For this reason, they needed to learn 
new strategies and tactics. They would also need to make use of technologies 
which were practically unknown in Spain. This lack of knowledge was shown 
during the first months of the war, between July and October 1936, when a 
primitive war of columns developed, which pitted small infantry units, with no 
heavy weaponry, against each other.33 Expert advice from foreign military 
                                                          
29 José María Azuaga, Tiempo de lucha. Granada-Málaga: represión, resistencia y guerrilla, 1939-1952 
(Salobreña, 2013), 449-451, 457, 596-597, 1,023-1,060; Moreno, La resistencia, 574; García Piñeiro, 
Luchadores, 1,002 
30 Grzegorz Motyka, Tomasz Stryjek, Rafał Wnuk, Adam F. Baran, Wojna po wojnie. Antysowieckie 
podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1953  (Gdańsk-Warsaw 2012), 115, 292;  José 
María Faraldo, La Europa clandestina. Resistencia a las ocupaciones nazi y soviética, 1938-1948 (Madrid, 
2011), 245, 249; Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge 2006), 249 
31 Motyka, Stryjek, Wnuk, Baran, Wojna po wojnie, 168-189, 292; Andrei Miroiu, Romanian 
Counterinsurgency and its Global Context, 1944–1962 (London, 2016), 36-37, 40, 75 
32 Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2002), 
286-298 
33 Gabriel Cardona, ‘Las operaciones militares’, in Manuel Tuñón de Lara, et. al, La Guerra Civil Española. 
50 años después (Barcelona 1985), 206; Gabriel Cardona, ‘Rebelión militar y Guerra Civil’, in Santos Juliá 
advisors, the placing of each army under a single command and the massive 
arrival of heavy weaponry from Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union slowly 
transformed the war: from the initial symmetric nonconventional warfare to 
conventional civil warfare from spring 1937 onwards.34 From then until April 1939, 
the war was fought between two regular armies on the battlefield, using the 
power of modern artillery by land, sea and air.  
 The defeat of the regular Republican Army did not signify the end of the 
internal armed conflict but a second military transformation of the war. After 1st 
April 1939 Franco’s dictatorship had to confront an enemy that was much weaker, 
less numerous and completely isolated, but, at the same time, extremely elusive. 
As one of the most senior officials charged with eliminating all resistance in Spain 
admitted, the irregular civil war in the 1940s was “a cold, silent war in which”, 
unlike a “regular campaign, (…) the enemy was hardly seen”.35 This new kind of 
war posed a challenge to the Spanish military which, like its Western 
counterparts, had an extremely limited knowledge on guerrilla warfare in 1939.36 
Later, WWII and various colonial wars would give the French, British and North 
American armies the experience necessary to formulate a new doctrine of 
counterinsurgency in the 1960s.37  
In this context, was the Spanish military influenced by modern forms of 
totalitarian counterinsurgency implemented by the German and Italian armies 
                                                          
(coord.), República y Guerra en España, 1931-1939 (Madrid 2006), 235-238; Gerald Howson, Arms for 
Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London 1998), 28-30 
34 Gabriel Cardona, Historia militar de una guerra civil. Estrategia y tácticas de la guerra de España 
(Barcelona 2006), 122; Cardona, ‘Rebelión, 246-247; Yuri Rybalkin, Stalin y España: La ayuda militar 
soviética a la República (Madrid 2007), 45, 59-96; Josep María Solé and Joan Villaroya, España en llamas. 
La guerra civil desde el aire (Madrid 2003), 9-10; Howson, Arms, 231. On the military concept of 
asymmetric nonconventional warfare, see: Kalyvas, ‘Warfare, 92. On the Spanish case: José Luis Ledesma, 
‘Qué violencia para qué retaguardia o la República en guerra de 1936’, Ayer, 76-4 (2009), 94-95.  
35 Eulogio Limia, Reseña general del problema del bandolerismo en España después de la Guerra de 
Liberación, 23 de julio de 1957, 30. Movimiento Guerrillero, Caja 105, Carpeta 3/2 (AHCCPCE) 
36 M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in 
France, 1940–1944 (London 2004), 3;  Jorge Marco, ‘Transnational Soldiers and Guerrilla Warfare from 
the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War', War in History 26-2 (2019), 2-3, 10, 20 
37 Gabriel Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité à nos jours (Paris 1958); 
Roger Trinquer, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport 2006); David Galuga, 
Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice (Westport 2006) 
during WWII?38 This is certainly a possibility, given that Franco’s Spain, although 
it remained neutral in the international war, was an ally of the Axis and 
maintained close relations with its intelligence services. It even sent a contingent 
of soldiers to combat the Soviets along with the Wehrmacht.39 However, I have 
not found any significant evidence of a major influence. For this reason, I would 
argue that the war against the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement was a small 
laboratory for the Spanish military, a self-learning experience. It was “a Korea in 
miniature”, recognized a Civil Guard, which two decades later "was very useful in 
the fight against ETA", declared a Spanish Army General years later.40  
 Counterinsurgency in Spain led to the use of a large repertoire of 
techniques of repression against the armed groups and the civilians who 
collaborated with the resistance, which would be perfected over the next decade. 
During the early years the strategy was one of direct combat with the armed 
groups, while, from 1944, psychological warfare, the use of military intelligence 
and the persecution of support networks became more widely used. In the direct 
combat the dictatorship employed different military forces. The army directed 
the persecution of guerrilla groups in those zones where these had a greater 
presence, between 1939 and 1942, becoming more of an auxiliary force from 1943. 
The Civil Guard was charged with fighting the armed groups in the regions with 
less activity during these early stages before taking over counterinsurgency 
throughout the country in 1943. In addition to the army, the Civil Guard also 
received help from the armed police and the Brigada Político-Social (political 
police).41 Further assistance was also available in the form of some 100,000 
                                                          
38 Henning Pieper, ‘The German Approach to Counterinsurgency in the Second World War’, The 
International History Review, 37-3 (2015); H. James Burgwyn, ‘General Roatta’s war against the 
partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 9-3 (2004) 
39 Xosé Manuel Nuñez Siexas, Camarada invierno. Experiencia y memoria de la División Azul, 1941-
1945 (Barcelona 2016) 
40 Tomás Cossias, La lucha contra el Maquis en España (Madrid 1956), 22; Diego Carcedo, Sáenz de Santa 
María. El general que cambió de bando (Madrid 2004), 60 
41 Limia, Reseña, 1; Francisco Aguado, Historia de la Guardia Civil (Madrid 1984), 191-192, 212; Harmut 
Heine, La oposición política al franquismo (Barcelona 1983), 432-433; Serrano, Maquis, 35, 79. 
civilians, mainly Falangist volunteers, who, from 1945, were formed into 
paramilitary groups known as Somatén.42   
Between 1939 and 1942, in those regions with low numbers of guerrilla 
fighters, mixed groups of civil guards, armed police and Falangists were formed to 
combat them. In remote villages where state forces were absent, the local authorities 
organized local people into paramilitary groups to pursue the guerrilla groups. By 
contrast, in areas with larger numbers of guerrilla fighters, such as Asturias, 
Ourense, Santander, Sierra Morena or Montes de Toledo, large-scale combing of the 
mountains was carried out by Columnas de Operaciones (operational units) and 
security patrols by the so-called Grupos de Limpieza (cleansing groups). Both were 
composed of soldiers, civil guards, police and Falangists.43  
As the deployment of large military units to combat small highly mobile 
armed groups was impractical,44 the dictatorship decided to change strategy, and, 
from 1942, promoted the use of smaller, more agile, military units. The Civil Guard 
deployed Grupos Móviles (mobile groups), Grupos de Montaña (mountain groups), 
small brigades and, above all, groups known as ‘contrapartidas’, which played an 
important part in the elimination of the anti-Francoist guerrilla.  “Our worst 
enemies were the contrapartidas”, the guerrilla fighter Francisco Rey Balbis 
commented years later.45 These were paramilitary groups of around ten members, 
with a composition which varied with time. During the regular civil war and the first 
phase of irregular warfare, from 1937 to 1942, they were groups of persecution 
composed of Falangists or mixed forces of soldiers, civil guards and Falangists.46  
From 1942 the contrapartidas were organized by the Civil Guard and named 
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Grupos de Fuerzas del Servicio Especial (special service forces groups), becoming, 
in 1947, their main counterinsurgency tool. They lived in the mountains, passing 
themselves off as guerrilla fighters, thus creating a climate of mistrust and fear 
among the local population. Their function was to combine elements of 
psychological warfare, intelligence collection and to be the most effective strike 
force against the armed groups. The contrapartidas became the chief protagonists 
of the irregular war, carrying out massacres and other atrocities notable for their 
brutality. These special counterinsurgency groups, under the control of the Civil 
Guard, initially consisted of volunteer civil guards and local people who knew the 
area. However, in 1947, the latter were replaced by former guerrilla fighters who had 
deserted. Their knowledge of the support networks, refuges, camps and routes used 
by the guerrilla groups proved devastating for the resistance.47  
 The dictatorship also implemented exceptional measures in the areas with 
the greatest guerrilla activity, thus making these areas de facto occupied zones.  
Particularly extreme policies were introduced in Asturias, León and Galicia between 
1939 and 1942, and in Teruel, Castellón, Málaga and Granada between 1947 and 1952. 
Here, large areas, centred on the mountains, were declared ‘warzones’, thus creating 
a “cordon sanitaire” under military control.48 Their principal objective was to isolate 
the armed groups by cutting them off from their support networks. The 
counterinsurgency policy paid special attention to the families of the guerrillas, who 
provided them with food, logistics and information. In Asturias and Galicia special 
centres were set up for their internment, such as the concentration camp at Figueras 
(Asturias), where 700 women and their young children were interned.49 Another 
preventive measure was the forced deportation of families to areas more than 250 
km from their homes.50 Economic repression also obliged many guerrillas’ families 
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to emigrate. In addition to being denied access to the labour market in their 
villages, their houses, farmsteads or any other properties or tools could be 
confiscated and burned.51 The most common sanction for those who stayed was 
the requirement to report to the Civil Guard post three times a day, making it 
difficult for them to collaborate with the guerrilla groups.52  
Control of the local population was not limited to the families of guerrilla 
fighters but extended to all the inhabitants of the area. Those who worked in the 
mountains (smallholders, shepherds, resin collectors, etc.) needed special 
authorization. Since many guerrilla groups used upland farmhouses as night-time 
refuges, sleeping in the mountains was also prohibited. The owners were required 
to hand over the keys to the Civil Guard each night. In some areas even working in 
the mountains by day was prohibited, with devastating effects on the local economy. 
A curfew from 7pm to 7am was also imposed and the Civil Guard would seal the 
doors of the houses to ensure that no-one was able to help the guerrillas during the 
night. The next morning the seal would be inspected, and, if there were any signs of 
it having been tampered with, the occupants would be arrested.53 Nonetheless, in 
some of the most remote villages, the guerrilla fighters behaved as if they were in a 
liberated zone. In these cases, from 1947, the same policy as that used in Asturias 
and Santander in 1939 and 1940 was implemented: the forced displacement of the 
whole population. These displacements could be temporary or permanent, as in 
Acebuchal, a village in Málaga where all forty families were evicted in 1948 and only 
permitted to return in 1953 when guerrilla activity had ceased.54 
 
Brutality and Massacres  
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 “We must wage war with no quarter on our enemies in the mountains 
until their extermination is achieved, and, since their activities are aided 
by accomplices, accessories and confidantes, the same system should be 
employed with these (…) All effective means at our disposal should be 
employed to ensure this.”55 
  
 Emilio Álvarez-Arenas, director of the Civil Guard, made this emphatic 
declaration in an internal order of August 1941. The opposition press underlined 
the iron internal discipline within the Civil Guard, who expelled any member not 
considered sufficiently zealous in the repression of the guerrilla groups and their 
support networks.56 Official documents and testimonies of civil guards have 
confirmed this,57 to the point that an official would kill some ordinary civil guards 
for “unlimited negligence and indescribable apathy”.58 In conjunction with this 
discipline the Civil Guard also offered financial incentives and promotions for the 
death or arrest of guerrilla fighters and their go-betweens.59 Declarations issued 
by the military authorities deemed the guerrilla fighters as “legal hunting 
trophies for all citizens”.60 These terms were typical in the internal reports of the 
security forces as were oral testimonies describing how dead guerrilla fighters were 
“dragged through the streets as if they were hunting trophies.”61  
“Fresh meat here! They’ve caught a mountain goat!”, shouted a woman in 
the market on seeing some guards leading a mule carrying the body of a guerrilla 
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fighters in the saddle.62 This animalization of the guerrilla members was another 
example of the dehumanization of the ‘internal enemy’, a tactic which the Spanish 
right had been developing since the start of the 20th century and which shaped 
the war. This ‘internal enemy’ had certain ideological and class-based 
characteristics. Firstly, it gathered together all those who had challenged the 
traditional order: socialists, anarchists, communists, liberals, republicans, 
feminists, freemasons and peripheral nationalists. Secondly, it incorporated those 
who had rebelled against their traditional subaltern role, particularly urban 
workers and peasants. In the collective imagination of the Spanish right, this 
“rabble” had certain ‘oriental’ characteristics and were clearly racially inferior, 
being compared with the North African rebels who had fought the colonial troops 
during the first decades of the 20th century.63 The guerrilla fighters and their 
support network, mainly left-wingers and peasants, were the quintessential 
internal enemy of the Francoists.  
The high degree of brutality employed by the military and paramilitary 
forces in the irregular war was in keeping with the extent to which the internal 
enemy had been dehumanized. Some go-betweens were paraded naked through 
the streets carrying boards with humiliating messages while the civil guards 
entertained themselves by striking them or shooting at the ground to make them 
run. The victims were so far removed from the human condition in the eyes of the 
perpetrators that they could be bound and thrown into a pigsty with the pigs. This 
type of degrading treatment was accompanied by constant beatings which left the 
peasants severely injured. The reasons given for this treatment could be as trivial 
as the wife of a dead guerrilla fighter attempting to retrieve her husband’s wedding 
ring before his body was buried in a common grave.64  
This dehumanization of the internal enemy led the perpetrators to a 
paroxysm of violence. Many years later, a civil guard remembered how one of his 
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superiors, while they were transporting some captured guerrilla fighters, had said 
to him: “Look at the backs of their heads, perfect for putting a bullet in”. A short 
time later, they were taken off the lorry and “there was a bloodbath”.65 Falangists, 
soldiers and civil guards trampled on the bodies after hunting them down in front 
of the horrified local people, to the delight of their colleagues. As described at the 
start of this article, go-betweens were also dragged behind horses until they were 
torn to pieces, a fate also shared by some guerrilla fighters.66 
One of the techniques of repression which had the greatest psychological 
effect on the population was to put corpses on public display.67 This was widely 
practised in the first weeks of the conventional civil war but prohibited by the 
military authorities in February 1937.68 However, the nature of the irregular war 
led the dictatorship to reinstate it. The guerrilla groups had the advantage of 
invisibility, which attracted popular support and helped to mythologize them.69 
The exhibiting of corpses for days in the village square was intended to expunge 
these myths from the collective imagination. On occasions, even the authorities 
organized trips to see the body of a famous guerrilla fighter. In addition, this 
tactic also served to spread fear through the community. All the villagers were 
forced to witness the macabre spectacle of the still-warm corpses paraded around 
on horseback.70 “The village was completely terrified”, remembers a villager.71 
However, the civilian population maintained a wide range of social attitudes 
towards the dictatorship that went from frontal resistance to the most absolute 
adhesion. A clear example of this last case was the participation of some 
community members in this sinister ritual of hitting the corpses of the guerrillas, 
pulling their hair to show their heads and bringing lighters to burn their skin. In 
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this sense, these community members recovered the rituals of collective obscenity 
similar to those they used in the first months of the war in 1936.72 
 
The anti-Francoist opposition claimed that, in January 1947, there had been 
a meeting of the leadership of the Civil Guard in which it was agreed that in the 
counterinsurgency war there should be no prisoners taken. The aim was to hide 
crimes and thus silence international criticism received in the wake of the death 
sentences handed out to some guerrilla fighters who had previously fought in the 
French Resistance. While there is no proof that this meeting ever took place, 
Manuel Prieto declared that, in view of the orders he had received when fighting 
the guerrilla groups, he suspected that Franco must have given some classified or 
purely verbal order to the head of the Civil Guard.73 Even if such an order was 
given, it should be regarded more as an encouragement to violence, rather than to 
be interpreted literally, since the period between 1946 and 1949 was actually when 
the greatest number of go-betweens were arrested and tried by military courts.74 
However, it would be no contradiction to say that during this period there were 
also the most atrocities and massacres, particularly of civilians. The relatives of 
guerrillas and left-wing villagers were taken into the mountains to be used as 
human shields during the fighting. The best they could hope for was to return 
home badly injured after suffering a beating. Their feelings of terror would take 
some time to subside after being subjected to mock executions by firing-squad. 
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The less fortunate ones were hacked to death after having their genitals or tongue 
mutilated. 75  
The extent of the massacres of civilians suspected of aiding the guerrilla 
movement varied. There were some cases where between 10 and 30 peasants were 
killed, but a trickle of killings was more common: either one by one or of fewer 
than 10 people.76 These massacres were eventually carried out as public spectacles. 
In several villages in Extremadura the Civil Guard would periodically take those 
suspected of being go-betweens to the bridge of Puente de Almaraz and throw 
them into the River Tajo. While trying to reach the riverbank they would be shot 
by Falangists.77 In Asturias on 16th January 1951, the Civil Guard assembled 300 
miners at the morning change of shift. They then gave a beating to one suspected 
of being a go-between for the guerrilla fighters, finishing him off with a bullet as 
he lay dying.78 There were also cases of the bodies of go-betweens being put on 
public display, as described by the civil guard Manuel Prieto, who exhibited three 
corpses “to serve as a warning to the people”.79  
However, the majority of the massacres of civilians took place far away from 
the public eye. The Civil Guard and the contrapartidas usually arrested peasants or 
removed them from prison and took them to an outlying area where they were 
killed. Official reports generally covered up these killings by claiming to have 
applied the Ley de Fugas: the killing of a person on the pretext that he had tried to 
escape from the authorities. This procedure was traditionally used by the Spanish 
military to combat banditry or insurgents in the colonial wars,80 but never to the 
extent that it was used in the irregular civil war. On other occasions the bodies 
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were disposed of and the deaths not registered in any official document,81 as would 
occur many years later in Latin America.  
Was this brutalization a result of specific ideological preconditions, which 
oriented the policy of radical political cleansing?  Or was it conditioned by local 
and internal circumstances, which led to cumulative radicalisation of violence?82 
To what extent did revenge and an absence of information contribute to the 
extension of these practices?83 There is no simple answer to these questions. The 
program of political cleansing implemented by the Francoists from 1936 is the 
framework that allows us to interpret this process of brutalization. At the same 
time, throughout the 1940s there were geographical and chronological variations 
in the intensity of violence and brutality. These variations did not depend on the 
lack of local information (as I will demonstrate in the following section), but on 
the different decision-making process followed by regional military officers, who 
enjoyed a high level of autonomy, and the national and international political 
context.  
The vast majority of massacres and acts of brutality took place between 
1947 and 1949. In 1945 and 1946, there was a series of international campaigns 
against the death sentence being employed by military tribunals against guerrilla 
fighters who had previously belonged to the French resistance.84 For that reason, 
the decision to increase massacres in isolated areas –where it was less likely that 
events would come to light abroad- responded to a need to conceal the crimes 
committed by the dictatorship. At the same time, the Franco regime felt that it was 
finally free to obliterate the guerrilla movement after the clear signals sent by the 
main international actors in favour of not intervening in Spain.85 
Finally, local dynamics such as personal/political feuds and feelings of 
revenge also influenced the process of brutalization. The campaign of 
extermination against the guerrilla movement initiated by the dictatorship in 1947 
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intensified these local conflicts, generating a cycle of reprisals which had 
disastrous consequences. Guerrilla fighters, go-betweens, local collaborators of the 
dictatorship and state forces were involved in a devastating logic of action and 
counter-reaction, which radicalized the brutality of both armed actors.86 
 
Information and Counterinsurgency 
 The systematic use of massacres and other atrocities did not preclude the 
use of other more sophisticated techniques of repression. In 1944 the Civil Guard 
created regional schools providing specific courses on counterinsurgency.87  The 
teaching emphasized the importance of the collection, classification and use of 
information. During the conventional civil war the Francoist authorities greatly 
improved the intelligence services to facilitate the compiling of military and 
political information on the enemy. The former was intended to gain a tactical 
advantage on the battlefield while the latter was used to aid the programme of 
political cleansing.88 However, the nature of the irregular war, with a scattered 
enemy who blended perfectly into the population, rendered the intelligence 
services even more important and led to the implementation of slightly different 
tactics to those used previously. “Information” must be “the main instrument of 
repression” against “las partidas” (guerrilla groups) who “function thanks to help, 
go-betweens and collaborators”,89 concluded a Civil Guard expert. 
 The offices of information of the regional military governments, the 
intelligence section of the armed police, the Dirección General de Seguridad 
(general security council) and the Falange all collaborated in the persecution of the 
anti-Francoist guerrilla movement, although the most significant contribution was 
made by the intelligence service of the Civil Guard and the ‘contrapartidas’. One of 
its principal objectives was to infiltrate the guerrilla groups, and the political 
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groups supporting them, with informers. The first rudimentary attempts were 
made by mid-level officials acting on their own initiative and generally involved 
obtaining the collaboration of small armed groups following their arrest.90 However, 
from 1945, more thorough plans for infiltration were drawn up, co-ordinated by the 
regional command. At times undercover agents would spend months passing 
themselves off as guerrilla fighters in the mountains in order to win the trust of the 
armed groups and be integrated into their structures. Nonetheless, the most 
effective tactic was infiltration by go-betweens and guerrilla fighters who had been 
arrested and became informers. This occurred to such an extent that in the 
Agrupación Guerrillera de Granada (the main guerrilla group in Andalucía) three of 
the five leaders would become active informers for the Civil Guard.91 The 
information and co-operation of these informers was the key to the dismantling of 
the armed groups and their support networks. 
 The intelligence services of the Civil Guard also used psychological 
techniques to undermine the strength of the guerrilla groups. The most effective 
was the so-called ‘tactic of attraction’ whereby guerrilla fighters were encouraged to 
desert. It had already been used by Francoist troops during the conventional civil 
war in occupied zones where trapped republicans had fled to the mountains but 
was refined during the 1940s. Between 1937 and 1945 the method was to drop leaflets 
in the mountains informing those who had not committed crimes of violence that 
they would not be prosecuted if they handed themselves in on a certain date.92 
However, this tactic lost effectiveness when it became clear that the promise would 
not be kept.  
From 1946-1947 three new features were added to the ‘tactic of attraction’. 
The first was to order the cessation of mass arrests of go-betweens, to postpone 
interrogations and to offer to release recently arrested guerrilla fighters on bail, prior 
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to initiating the campaign. The second was to dispense with the time limit for 
guerrilla fighters to hand themselves in, meaning that the campaign could last for 
months.93 The third was for the Civil Guard to prepare personalized leaflets aimed 
at specific guerrillas, using information obtained from interrogations, and deliver 
these to their families.94 In this way, the Civil Guard hoped to earn the trust of the 
guerrilla fighters and increase the pressure on them through their families.  
This tactic was also used during WWII. It is more likely to succeed during 
periods of decadence in the guerrilla movement when the proximity of defeat tends 
to encourage strategies for individual survival.95 This is exactly what took place in 
Spain. From 1947 the number of desertions was greater than that of arrests. This 
technique was not only successful in reducing the number of guerrillas, as , at the 
end of the campaign, the Civil Guard arrested the deserters and gave them two 
choices: join the contrapartidas, with a promise of better  conditions in prison, or to 
be harshly judged by the military courts. A high percentage of the deserters are 
believed to have chosen the former, thus causing further damage to the guerrilla 
movement.96 
Another task of the information services was the preparation of files on 
the population in zones of guerrilla activity. This was achieved by going from 
town to town listing all reports made by civilians and personal information 
released by town halls, priests and the local branch of the Falange. This 
information was then used to place each civilian into one of three categories: 
dangerous, favourable to the regime or indifferent.97 State forces could then take 
specific measures against those suspected of sympathizing with the guerrilla 
movement. A blacklist could then be compiled and used to decide which 
individuals would be watched, arrested or killed. This was a similar technique to 
that used by the dictatorship to determine responsibilities during the war 
following punitive logic. 
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 However, the information services also employed other methods to obtain 
information, such as torture during interrogation. Prisoners of war, common 
prisoners and those under arrest suffered ill-treatment both during the 
conventional war and during the 1940s. This was mainly motivated by a desire for 
vengeance or that the internal enemies were less than human in the eyes of the 
perpetrators.98 The purpose of this ill-treatment was not to extract a confession 
as the victim’s guilt was taken for granted. The great difference between the ill-
treatment meted out following punitive logic and the torture following 
counterinsurgent logic was that the latter sought a confession which would 
permit further arrests and operations against the anti-Francoist opposition.99  
 The Civil Guard produced a manual detailing different torture techniques, 
which they could apply continuously over a period of months. Under the Fuero 
de los Españoles, passed in 1945, any detainee had to be released or sent to the 
judicial authority within 72 hours. However, in practice there was no time limit 
for a suspect to be detained.100 The only day of rest for a detainee was Sunday, 
“when the torturers went to mass”.101 Hanging up naked detainees and beating 
them until they lost consciousness; placing splinters under fingernails, 
submerging faces in water until asphyxiation; applying electric shocks to wrists 
and genitals; beating and burning the soles of the feet; and pulling out fingernails 
and toenails were the most common methods remembered by survivors.102 
Women were also subjected to specific forms of torture. Simply being naked is 
remembered by many female detainees as a form of humiliation, as is ill-
treatment of their children during the interrogations. They were also the victims 
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of sexualized torture such as rape, mutilation of the clitoris, the insertion of red-
hot metal into the vagina and electric shocks to the nipples.103  
Torture sessions were carried out in Civil Guard headquarters, police 
stations and secret torture centres such as farmhouses or factories.104 An 
unknown number of civilians died as a result of torture, with the crimes being 
hidden by the perpetrators recording the Ley de Fugas or suicide as the cause of 
death.105 Most victims of torture suffered severe physical and psychological after-
effects for the rest of their lives. Some were unfit for work or were admitted to 
psychiatric units.  Others were unable to cope and committed suicide.106 
Although it is taboo amongst the survivors, a significant number gave in and 
confessed, as admitted by the guerrilla fighter Camilo de Dios.107 As was the case 
in other contemporary European military forces, the Francoist state forces found 
torture to be the most effective method for extracting information in 
counterinsurgency warfare.108 At the same time, from the mid-1940s, new 
methods of interrogation were experimented with, such as the injection of 
Pentothal (´truth serum´), as both victims and perpetrators acknowledge.109 
 
 
Conclusions 
 There has been consensus among researchers for decades that the defeat 
of the regular Republican Army on 1st April 1939 did not mark the end of the 
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violence but the continuation of the process of political extermination of the 
internal enemy, initiated on 17th July 1936. In this article I have shown that in 
military terms the war did not end on 1st April 1939 but underwent a 
transformation from a conventional civil war into an irregular civil war. The anti-
Francoist resistance presented less of a challenge than the organized regular 
Republican Army between 1936 and 1939 and was miniscule compared to 
irregular armed groups in Europe during the 1940s. However, in military terms, 
the conflict between the dictatorship and the resistance undeniably took the 
form of an irregular civil war, as was the case in several countries in Europe 
during and after WWII. To describe the 1940s as a post-war period would be to 
underplay the armed conflict which had a great impact on the rural areas of the 
country while also resonating in the cities. 
 I have insisted here that the irregular war brought with it its own logic of 
violence, which, within a common programme of political cleansing, interacted 
with a simultaneous logic of punitive violence. The two logics were directed 
against the same internal enemy, which, in political and class terms had 
challenged the traditional order. After the defeat of the regular Republican Army 
the dictatorship applied an extensive punitive programme. The defeated were 
obliged to pay for past actions. Most were classified by the dictatorship as 
redeemable and subjected to an intense process of isolation, punishment and 
forced conversion. On the other hand, thousands of republicans were regarded as 
irredeemable and were executed by military courts. This punitive logic was 
designed to permanently subjugate the beaten enemy.   
 The magnitude of the repression was such that a small, but significant, 
number of the beaten enemies decided to rebel throughout the 1940s. The armed 
defiance of the guerrilla groups triggered an irregular civil war, and, with it, the 
logic of counterinsurgency violence. The organization of armed groups against 
the dictatorship was a threat to the stabilization of the regime and the most 
significant reminder that that the internal enemy was still not completely 
exterminated. For this reason, the dictatorship combined different repressive 
techniques, including the military courts and the penal system, but, above all, the 
logic of counterinsurgency employed a wide range of brutal practices and 
massacres against both civilians and combatants. 
Many of the methods used were similar to those employed in the 
conventional civil war, even some which had disappeared, such as the public 
display of bodies. However, there were also new practices. One of the most 
significant was the development of the intelligence services. These created ample 
networks of informers, directed paramilitary groups specializing in dirty warfare 
tactics, such as the contrapartidas, and introduced techniques of psychological 
warfare. They also designed techniques to attract guerrillas, infiltrated the main 
armed and political groups of the anti-Francoist opposition and systematically 
used torture to obtain information. Those experiments in counterinsurgency 
tactics carried out by other western military forces in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam or 
Angola had already been put into practice by Spanish forces against their fellow 
citizens in their own country. 
With the exception of a few dozen men who decided not to give 
themselves up and died in silence or remained in hiding until the end of the 
dictatorship, the rebellious enemies laid down their arms at the end of 1952. In 
1948 Stalin recommended to the Spanish Communist Party not to focus 
exclusively on armed struggle, but also to develop other strategies such as 
infiltration into the structures of the state. The devastating effects of 
counterinsurgency, the internal conflicts within the anti-Franco opposition, and 
the lack of external support, led the Spanish Communist Party to make the 
decision four years after Stalin’s advice. The rebellious enemy was finally beaten 
after being subjected to more than a decade of terror. There was no official 
declaration to mark the end of the irregular war. In 1956, the Spanish Communist 
Party, the political organization which had given most support to the guerrilla 
movement, rejected the use of violence to overthrow the dictatorship.  
Henceforth, the dictatorship would modulate the intensity of the violence 
and regulate the methods of repression in response to the challenges presented 
by a new generation of anti-Francoists. Nonetheless, some counterinsurgency 
methods learned during the irregular war, such as the use of informers, torture 
and infiltration of organizations became part of the everyday repertoire of 
Francoist anti-subversive policy.   
 
 
 
